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ABSTRACTS
heirs of their mother, if the testator's intent had been carried out.
The tract, less D's share, could have been sold to satisfy the inter-
ests of the other cotenants. If, however, the portion claimed by D
exceeds the testator's one-half undivided interest in the whole
property, the entire tract would have to be sold to protect the
interests of all parties.
Richard Marion Alker
ABSTRACTS
Corporations-Restraint on Stock Transfers
P and D entered into a stock option agreement whereby it was
agreed that in the event of the death of D, or in the event of his
offering his stock for sale during his life, he would sell and P
would buy all of D's stock in X corporation at one dollar per share.
If the option were not exercised then D had the right to sell without
restriction. They owned all the stock in X corporation. Upon D's
death P tendered one dollar per share to the executors of D's
estate, but the executor refused to sell. The actual value per share
was $1,060. The Orphan's Court of Chester County, Pennsylvania
ordered specific performance. Held, affirmed. The restriction of
sale was not absolute or unreasonable. It was made between mature
members of a close family without over-reaching, fraud or deceit.
The discrepancy between the sale price and the actual value did
not invalidate the agreement. In re Mather's Estate, 410 Pa. 373,
189 A.2d 586 (1963).
In the principal case the dissent argued that the agreement
created an absolute restraint against tranfers because the first
refusal price was nominal in relation to the value of the shares
at the time the arrangement was made. The AvmncA Lw oF
PnoPERTY supports the dissent, stating that the effect of a pre-
emption as a restraint on alienation hinges upon the matter of
price. If the property is required to be offered at a sacrifice price
this is a restraint on alienation because the owner will keep it
rather than sell. 6 A caIAN LAw oF PnoPE Tar § 26.65 (Casner
ed. 1952).
The problem of restraining alienation of stock, whether by price
or other means, is one of conflict of basic ideas. On the one hand
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is the general principle that provisions which restrict a stockhold-
er's right to sell or transfer his stock are regarded with disfavor
and are strictly construed. Annot., 2 A.L.R.2d 747 (1949). On the
other hand is the general principle that stock in a close corpora-
tion is not merely property; it creates a personal relationship
analogous otherwise to a partnership, and an appropriate restric-
tion helps protect good management. Mason v. Mallard Tel. Co.,
213 Iowa 1076, 240 N.W. 671 (1932).
The courts seem to favor the second idea. They have held valid
stock restrictions involving first option prices based on: current
value, market value, book value, par value, and value stated by
appraisers. Model Clothing House v. Dickinson, 646 Minn. 367,
178 N.W. 957 (1920); Nicholson v. Franklin Brewery, 82 Ohio 94,
91 N.E. 991 (1910); Doss v. Yingling, 95 Ind. App. 494, 172 N.E.
801 (1930); Garrett v. Philadelphia Lawn Mower Co., 39 Pa.
Super. 78 (1909); New England Trust Co. v. Abbott, 162 Mass.
148, 38 N.E. 432 (1894), respectively. No court has said that a
nominal option price is not a restraint on alienation. The principal
case did say that the restraint was not absolute because after
refusal to buy the owner was free to sell at any price. At this
point the court seems to strain to allow a restriction that was
serving a useful purpose.
The principle that courts do not favor restraints on alienation
must always be kept in mind. At some point the inadequacy of
option price might become unreasonable in light of the circum-
stances. Allen v. Biltmore Tissue Corp., 2 N.Y.2d 534, 141 N.E.2d
812 (1957), said that when any restriction reaches this point it is
void.
Since courts look upon restrictions with disfavor another court
might consider a nominal option price as the one in the principal
case a restraint on alienation. This court has gone further than any
other court, and it might be, as the dissent suggests, they have
gone too far.
Estate Taxation--Qualfication of Dower Interest Commuted to
Cash for Marital Deduction
W renounced the will of her husband, and as a result became
entitled to dower in one-third of the real estate of her husband.
In lieu of dower being assigned, W had her interest commuted to
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cash. P, executor of the estate of W's husband, brought an action
against the government to determine whether the estate was en-
titled to a marital deduction. Held, judgment for P. W never
had dower assigned. She did not have dower but only the right
to it. When her interest was commuted to cash it became a non-
terminable interest, and it was deductible from the adjusted gross
value of the estate. First Nat'l Exch. Bank of Roanoke v. United
States, 217 F. Supp. 604 (W.D. Va. 1963).
INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2056(a), provides that "the value of
a taxable estate shall be determined by deducting from the value
of the gross estate an amount equal to the value of any interest
in property which passes or has passed from the decedent to his
surviving spouse, but only to the extent that such interest is in-
cluded in determining the value of the gross estate." 'Vhere, on
the lapse of time, on the occurrance of an event or contingency,
or on the failure of an event or contingency to occur, an interest
passing to the surviving spouse will terminate or fail, no deduc-
tion shall be allowed." INT. BEv. CODE of 1954, § 2056(b).
The problem presented by the principal case in light of the
statute is the determination of what is a terminable interest. If the
interest is terminable there is no deduction. If the interest is non-
terminable there is a deduction. Thus, if an interest that passes
is a vested dower interest there is no deduction.
Huddleston v. Miller, 81 W. Va. 357, 94 S.E. 538 (1917), in
answer to the question of when a dower interest passes held that
until the assignment of dower the widow has merely a vested
right to sue for her dower interest, and it is only upon assignment
that she acquires a vested estate.
West Virginia further has a statute similar to the Virginia statute
in the principal case which provides that dower does not have to
be assigned. A payment of cash in lieu of dower can be given
where'the real estate involved will be enhanced or preserved by
not assigning dower in kind, and where the surviving spouse may
be fully compensated for such dower and her interest will not be
adversely affected. W. VA. CoDE ch. 43, art. 1, § 20 (Michie 1961).
Considering that a vested dower interest does not pass until
assigned, and that there can be payments of cash in lieu of dower
being assigned, it is possible that a dower interest might never
vest under West Virginia law. Therefore, it would seem to follow
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that where the right to dower is commuted to cash under West
Virginia law, the only interest that would pass would be a cash
interest which is non-terminable and allowable as a marital de-
duction.
Property-Effect on Dower Interest of Notice of Contract
to Convey Real Estate Before Marriage
H and his first wife had entered into a contract prior to their
divorce, providing that H would will all his property to the Ps.
H made his will in accordance with the contract. Subsequently H
married D who had no knowledge of either the agreement or the
will. Upon H's death D renounced the will and claimed a dower
interest in the real estate which H had conveyed by will to the Ps.
Ps brought suit for summary judgment to disallow D a dower
interest in the real estate. The United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida granted D her dower interest.
Held, affirmed. Where there was no notice of the existence of
such a contract or a will executed under it, the promisee of the
contract, who is the beneficiary of such will, could have his rights
restricted where the widow claims her dower right. Barkley v.
Barkley, 314 F.2d 188 (5th Cir. 1963).
In Harris v. Harris, 130 W. Va. 100, 43 S.E.2d 225 (1947), the
court reached a result contra to the principal case. The deceased
husband entered into a valid agreement with his first wife to will
all his property to her and their two children. He subsequently
obtained a divorce and married again. The husband died intestate
without disposing of his property. The second wife claimed a
dower interest in the property held by the husband at the time
of his death, but the court held that she was not so entitled. The
court denied recovery on the theory that under the contract to
convey the property the husband only held the legal title. The
woman and children held the equitable title. The husband, in
effect, held his property in trust for them, and dower does not
spring from a seisin in trust for another because the holder of the
legal title had no beneficial interest in himself. This theory is the
one followed by the majority of the courts. Annot., 63 A.L.R. 137
(1929), and 51 W. VA. L. REv. 60 (1949).
The court in the principal case allowed the widow to have
dower on the theory that it would be inequitable to deny her a
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right that marriage usually confers when she did not have notice
of the contract made by her husband.
In the Harris case, supra, the contract was recorded and the court
stated that in view of this fact the widow's lack of knowledge could
not sustain her claim. This statement seems to indicate that the
lack of knowledge might be a factor to consider. However, in the
next sentence the court further stated that marriage confers rights
only in property which a spouse holds beneficially for himself at
the time of the marriage ceremony.
It appears that the West Virginia court is saying that notice
may or may not be material but, the determining factor is the inter-
est the husband holds at the time of the marriage. A West Virginia
court would not, therefore, follow the holding in the principal
case.
Taxation-The Right to Collect Post-Bankruptcy Interest
P was adjudicated bankrupt. D, the United States, filed a claim
for taxes, but its claim was only partially satisfied. P was entitled
to an income tax refund for later years unless D could offset
the refund by charging post-bankruptcy interest on the unpaid
taxes. P filed a claim for refund. The United States District
Court of the Southern District of California denied the re-
fund. Held, affirmed. Taxes levied on the taxpayer by the
United States are not dischargeable in bankruptcy. Bankruptcy
did not discharge the principal, and it could not discharge interest.
White v. United States, 317 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1963).
Attempts to collect post-bankruptcy interest should be divided
into two areas: the collection from the bankrupt estate, and the
collection from the individual.
With regard to the federal government's right to collect interest
up to the date of payment from the estate there has been much
litigation. A minority and a majority view seem to have emerged.
The minority view is that where the government's claim is secured
by pre-bankruptcy lien the government can collect post-bankruptcy
interest from the estate. The weight of authority appears to deny
interest from the estate beyond the date of bankruptcy regardless
of a lien. Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 1119 (1961).
This issue is still open to much question and to determine the
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rights of the government one must look to the holdings of the
individual circuits. In United States v. Harrington, 269 F.2d 719
(4th Cir. 1959), the court followed what is stated above as the
majority view.
The principal case falls into the second area. Here the govern-
ment claimed that the interest survived the discharge in bank-
ruptcy on the same basis as a federal tax claim, and might still
constitute a valid charge against the bankrupt as an individual.
This has nothing to do with an attempt to collect post-bankruptcy
interest from the bankrupt estate.
The only other case directly in point is United States v. Mighell,
273 F.2d 682 (10th Cir. 1959). In this case the United States
contended that post-bankruptcy interest covered by pre-bankruptcy
liens survived the bankruptcy. The court allowed interest to the
date of bankruptcy but not beyond that point. The court cited
United States v. Harrington, supra, as their authority for the denial
of post-bankruptcy interest.
The court in the principal case admits that they are in conflict
with United States v. Mighell, supra, but states that they choose to
follow their trial court's decision.
With a conflict on the right of the government to collect post-
bankruptcy interest from the bankrupt estate, the conflict set up
by the principal case on the right of the government to collect post-
bankruptcy interest from the individual does not seem so strange.
Yet, it is hard to decide what can be used as a guide line to deter-
mine what any particular circuit will hold. One might think that
courts following the majority view as to bankrupt estates would
have a tendency to carry over that view into decisions concerning
post-bankruptcy interest against the individual. On the other hand,
courts following the minority view should use the minority reason-
ing in reaching a decision on allowing post-bankruptcy interest
against the individual. The principal case shows that no such
relationship exists. The court allowed post-bankruptcy interest
against the individual while stating that between the tax collector
and the bankrupt estate the interest would be suspended at the
time of adjudication. The split of authority thus exists in both
areas and it is hard to tell which way the different circuits will
handle the problem when it confronts them again.
Boyd Lee Warner, II
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